Ukraine’s Defense Ministry is again in hot water after its head, Rustem Umerov, dismissed another deputy Friday and skipped renewing a contract with the Defense Procurement Agency — an independent agency set up to buy weapons on Ukraine’s behalf to mitigate against to mitigate corruption risks.

Over the past two years, Ukraine’s Defense Ministry has repeatedly come under the public eye for corruption scandals of buying supplies at inflated prices – from eggs to winter coats.

At the same time, the Public Anti-Corruption Council has been working under the Ministry for several years, striving to shine a light on the Ministry’s activities and achieving some noticeable successes in fighting corruption.

Why does the ministry remain at the center of scandals? How have the elections to the public council, which recently began its work, affected the activities of the ministry? And what is nature of the conflict between Umerov and defense procurement agency head Maryna Bezrukova?

Kyiv Post discusses these issues with Tetiana Nikolaenko, a member of the anti-corruption council, re-elected last week.

– Tell us about this public council: what it does and why it is important. This council gives Ukrainian society an opportunity to monitor the work of the Ministry of Defense during the war. After all the recent scandals – such as eggs priced at 17 hryvnias or problems with weapons procurement – it gives society a tool to influence the ministry and show that corruption is unacceptable.

Other interesting topics

Ukraine reforms disability assessment system

Ukraine’s parliament passed a law to replace medical and social expert commissions, believed to be a major source of corruption, with disability assessment medical teams.

Are there similar councils in the US or Europe? There are no direct analogues. When we visited France last May and met with representatives of their Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they were very surprised that public oversight of the Ministry of Defense even exists. They have nothing like it. Interestingly, we are coming to Brussels next week, where this topic is getting attention. The Europeans are keen to create similar bodies – independent expertise to evaluate their ministers. European ministries are also interested in our work because they subsidize our economy and want to ensure transparency and efficiency. In addition, projects supporting specific initiatives often attract significant interest.

– By exposing corruption, doesn’t this sometimes lead Western figures to label Ukraine as highly corrupt? Yet it is your exposure that prevents further corruption. Corruption is everywhere, including France. After our conference – where we highlighted our successes in the fight against corruption over the past year – the French commented that we talk too openly about these issues. They are often silent about similar problems. Due to donor projects, Ukraine is under greater scrutiny than some European countries. Take, for example, the Czech initiative under President Petr Pavel. They faced a corruption scandal last fall involving the purchase of shells for Ukraine.

– You mean when some figures in the Czech Republic tried to profit by buying shells for Ukraine? Exactly. When I read about it, I laughed because the Ministry of Defense was dealing with issues that Ukraine spoke about a year earlier. When the Czechs took over tasks we had already implemented, they encountered the same risks we faced. With appropriate mechanisms for collaboration, we could have shared our experience, warned them of potential pitfalls, and advised where to focus attention.

– So what can the public council do? Do you have any authority beyond publicity? Advertising is everything to us. We do not have official authority. We cannot be compared to the public council of Nabu, which has powers defined by law and participates in disciplinary commission meetings with significant influence. For us, it’s about advocacy. We present recommendations or escalate issues to scandals, depending on the ministry’s response. The level of communication with Minister Reznikov was much better than with Minister Umerov. For example, Reznikov attended council meetings with his deputies and introduced his team. Although the scandal of eggs priced at 17 Hryvnias was not pleasant for him, Reznikov respected the will of the 40,000 people represented by the council at the time. Now this number exceeds 100,000. However, neither Umerov nor his deputies have participated in any council meetings.

-To what extent are the Ukrainian authorities really subject to corruption and problems? I will say this: Corruption in these institutions developed not over years but over decades. Some companies have occupied this market for decades and created entrenched systems. For example, before they introduced Prozorro (an online trading monitoring system to prevent corruption) they could manipulate this area however they wanted. With the introduction of Prozorro, they had to suppress their appetites to some extent and reduce abuse. Additional safeguards also arose. But during the war, when the ministry returned to direct procurement, it opened the doors – and gates – to new systems of corruption because there were many entrenched actors. This was not always at the management level but often at the middle level. For example, it was possible to “overlook” items in a company’s asset catalog where eggs were inexplicably priced at 17 Hryvnias per piece (about 0.5 USD).

-Really? Do you think Reznikov did not know about this? I am convinced that Minister Reznikov did not know that. The people handling these transactions knew exactly what “mistakes” they were making. I think it is entirely fair that the head of the department ended up behind bars, along with the deputy minister. These individuals, given their functional responsibilities, clearly understood what they were doing. At lower levels, some also understood how “mistakes” could be exploited. For example, they can manipulate specifications for items such as berets or tactical headphones, creating monopolistic conditions for specific companies to supply the Ministry of Defense. If an outsider tried to compete, they wouldn’t understand the system and would spend years just figuring out where the obstacles were buried.

-But Reznikov also resigned after the scandal with eggs priced at 17 Hryvnias. Yes, because he defended it stubbornly and convincingly. This was his political responsibility. We can argue that some political forces used this scandal to remove him, but he still had to bear political responsibility.

-What happened between Umerov and Bezrukova? Why is everything so dramatic? Minister Umerov is accused of chaos and tries to eliminate the head of the defense procurement agency, Bezrukova … The allegations of chaos against Umerov, rather than corruption, are linked to Alexey Reznikov. In 2022, Reznikov initiated the creation of two agencies for the procurement of weapons and ammunition. This removed procurement responsibilities from the Minister and transferred them to these agencies. Fortunately, professional buyers were appointed to these agencies. As a result, corruption levels have decreased. For example, abuses related to non-lethal purchases have also been reduced as these items are now procured through Prozorro. This mainly applies to food and clothing.

-Tell us about food addiction. How did it happen? The issue was that only intermediaries, not direct producers, were allowed to offer food supplies. The supply catalog included over 400 items. We tried to divide these into separate groups – cereals, meat products, dairy products – because no single producer can provide everything from water to sturgeon. It was challenging, but we managed to return these purchases to Prozorro. Now they are monitored online, and we have introduced an electronic catalog, which simplifies the control for the state logistics operator. Prices have fallen, which is a positive development. But intermediate companies do not want to give up their margins, so they try to compensate by lowering the quality of goods. Currently, the battle revolves around this issue.

-So, what happened to the agencies and the minister? These two agencies became a sort of political lightning rod for the ministry since the ministry itself no longer handled procurement. Over time, Maryna Bezrukova, head of the Defense Procurement Agency, began to assert herself and stopped following the ministry’s recommendations. She began to act as an independent purchasing entity, expressing her own opinions on whether certain quantities or items were necessary. This assertiveness did not sit well with the minister.

–And that’s why they started fighting her? It is significant that the Ministry has so far had no public confrontation with Bezrukova. First, there was the idea of ​​creating an agency specifically to buy drones. Then came the dramatic idea of ​​merging the Defense Procurement Agency with the Government Rear Operator and combining them under the Government Rear Operator structure. This was strange because the government rear operator is a smaller organization in terms of personnel. We spoke out and told the Ministry that they were misleading people by claiming that this was a NATO recommendation. It wasn’t true. NATO never recommended merging agencies during the war. Instead, NATO proposed creating a centralized agency after Martial Law ended, which would handle procurement for all law enforcement agencies.

-Arsen Zhumadilov, head of the state rear operator in charge of buying non-weapons and non-military goods (such as food), will now, in line with the Minister’s will, take over Bezrukova’s post… The ministry has had different relationships with the agencies and operators. Its relationship with the rear operator has been the best.

-Tell us about the corruption scandals in the Ministry of Defense that you and society as a whole managed to prevent. For example, there was the scandal involving the purchase of “winter” jackets. There was suspicion that although they were labeled as “winter”, they were not suitable for the season at all. Fortunately, due to community pressure, the Ministry of Defense allowed us access to the sheds where the jackets were stored. We removed some jackets and even sent them for inspection. Fortunately, there were jackets that had not yet been seized by the SBU, and we got them from Sharapov, the deputy minister. Upon examination we found that they did not meet the standards of a proper winter jacket. I even made a video demonstrating how the jacket tore apart in my hands – it was visibly poor quality. How could something like that behave in battle? We proved their poor quality, and this helped minimize threats to future direct contracts.

However, there is room for manipulation, for example when the logistics command quickly requests procurement within a month. In such cases, a single supplier is often the only viable option – this opens a window for hidden corruption.

Another important point is that we have managed to participate in meetings where decisions are made on the technical specifications of various items, for example tactical headphones, walkie-talkies and so on. This allows us to monitor how specifications are written, ensuring they do not create problems with tenders or invite corruption.